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The Media's Presence During the Execution
of a Search Warrant: A Per Se Violation of the
Fourth Amendment
BRAD M. JOHNSTON*
This Note addresses the constitutionality of media presence during the
execution of a search warrant at a private residence. After examining the
Fourth Amendment's history and the development of standards for its
application, the author highlights the recent conflict between the Second and
Eighth Circuits. The author's Fourth Amendment analysis finds that media
presence during the execution of search warrants implicates Fourth Amendment
protection of individuals 'privacy expectations, transforms media members from
private actors into state actors, and offends the reasonableness threshold for
constitutional invasions of individuals' homes. The author concludes his
analysis by finding that, consistent with the Second Circuit's view, media
presence during the execution of a search warrant is a per se violation of the
Fourth Amendment.
I. INTRODUCTION
"The privacy and sanctity of the home have been primary tenets
of our moral, philosophical, and judicial beliefs. "**
Members of the media, in an effort to gain a larger portion of the market
share, have become increasingly aggressive and intrusive in their newsgathering
techniques.' The hallmark of these aggressive and intrusive newsgathering
* I would like to thank Professor Sharon Davies for her insightful comments and
criticisms on this Note. Any errors or flaws that remain are, of course, my own. Most
importantly, I would like to thank my parents, Pat and Carroll, for their unconditional love
and support over the past years. They have made it possible for me to fulfill my dreams and
goals in school and in life.
** United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285-86 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
1 See John J. Walsh et al., Media Misbehavior and the Wages of Sin: The
Constitutionality of Consequential Damages for Publication of Ill-Gotten Information, 4 WM.
& MARY BIL RTs. J. 1111 (1996). "Driven by competition, the need for profits, and
demands for higher ratings or circulations, and provided wvith technological marvels such as
ever-smaller video cameras and tape machines, the media have shown an increasing
willingness to engage in unlawful methods of newsgathering." Id. at 1144. In fact, it was
ABC's use of hidden cameras and faux workers in its coverage of Food Lion's supermarket
operations-not the accuracy or inaccuracy of its reporting-that caused a jury to award Food
Lion compensatory and punitive damages. See Ginia Bellafante, Hide and Go Sue, TIME, Jan.
13, 1997, at 81. "[U]ndercover reporting tactics... have become commonplace in an era
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techniques are seen on real-life television programs2 and during news segments3
where camera crews accompany civil servants, especially police officers, while
they perform their official duties.4 Scenes of law enforcement officers entering
suspects' homes have become fixtures in American television.5 In fact, such
scenes have become more revealing as the media crew and camera now follow
the police into the home in order to provide coverage of the search and arrest.6
The media's entrance into private homes with the police raises a serious Fourth
Amendment issue: Does an unreasonable search occur, under the Fourth
Amendment, when members of the media accompany the police into the home
of a private individual during the execution of a search warrant?7
when there is a different TV newsmagazine show on almost every night of the week." Id. In
addition, local news shows are cashing in on undercover exposes "during ratings sweeps." Id.
2 The real-life television shows are epitomized by the show COPS. See COPS (FOX
television broadcast, Barbour/Langley Productions, Inc.). During the show COPS, camera
crews accompany the police while they are on patrol. See id. The show has become so
popular that uncensored versions of the show are now available on home video. See COPS
Too HOT FOR TV! (Barbour/Langley Productions, Inc. 1996).
3 Local news broadcasters have also begun to accompany the police during their patrols.
See Elsa Y. Ransom, Home: No Place for "Law Enforcement Theatricals"--The Outlawing
of Police/Media Home Invasion in Ayeni v. Mottola, 16 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 325 (1995);
see also Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996) (local television station in St. Louis
accompanied police during the execution of a search warrant), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081
(1997).
4 See Ransom, supra note 3.
At the 1995 meeting of the National Association of Television Program Executives,
fifteen new reality-based entertainment programs were unveiled, including at least three
that were exclusively devoted to fighting crime. All indications are that the public has a
voracious appetite for such programming-an appetite producers are eager to satisfy.
Id. at 325.
5 See id.
6 See id. A familiar television scenario depicts people being caught off-guard in their
homes. See id. at 355. The people who are present while the home is being searched by the
police and videotaped by the media "are often in various stages of undress, sometimes
cowering in comers or closets, and invariably shielding their faces from the glare of camera
lights as they are handcuffed and led away by [the] police." Id.
7 See id. at 334.
The central Fourth Amendment issue arising out of the joint incursions of police and
reporters inside private homes during searches and seizures, is whether the presence of
the media at the scene, invited by law enforcement officers, renders the search or seizure
unreasonable. The more fundamental question involved is whether the presence of any
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed the
constitutionality of the media's presence during the execution of a search
warrant in Ayeni v. Mottola.8 The Second Circuit held that the Fourth
Amendment's prohibition of unreasonable searches forbade police officers from
bringing a media camera crew into an individual's home during the execution
of a search warrant.9 The Eighth Circuit, however, reached the opposite
conclusion when it addressed the same issue two years later in Parker v.
Boyer.l0 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when the
police allow a media camera crew to enter an individual's home during the
execution of a search warrant. 11
Given the split among the circuits over the issue of the media's presence in
the home of a suspect during the execution of a search warrant, 12 it should be
considered by everyone who values civil liberties whether the Fourth
Amendment prohibits law enforcement officials from allowing media members
to enter a private home during the execution of a search warrant. 13 This Note
non-government third party, invited by officers, renders the search unreasonable.
Id.
The same Fourth Amendment issue can arise in the absence of a search warrant, but this
Note will specifically focus on the issue of the media's presence for news or entertainment
purposes during the execution of a search warrant. The methodology used and the conclusion
reached in this Note should be applicable to any situation where the police grant media
members access to an individual's home. Furthermore, this issue can arise when any third
party any private individual not authorized by the search warrant accompanies the police into
an individual's home. This Note, while focusing on the media's presence, will refer to and
address general third party presence during the execution of a search warrant. The reader
should recognize that the methodology and analysis is the same whether or not the third party
present during the execution of a search warrant is a part of the media.
8 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
9 See id. at 686.
10 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997).
11 See id. at 447.
12 The split between the Second and Eighth Circuits is legal and not factual. The facts in
the Ayeni and Parker cases are essentially the same. The circuits disagreed on whether Fourth
Amendment principles prohibited the media's presence. See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 447
(not self-evident that the Fourth Amendment prohibits media presence); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35
F.3d at 686 (clearly established Fourth Amendment principles prohibit media presence).
13 Commentators have discussed the Ayeni v. Mottola decision and have concluded that
the decision was correct, but they have failed to provide the Fourth Amendment analysis, in
light of the Eighth Circuit's opinion, that is necessary to reach the conclusion that the media's
presence at the execution of a search warrant is per se unreasonable under Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence. See, e.g., Ransom, supra note 3, at 355.
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will show, consistent with the Second Circuit's opinion in Ayeni, 14 that the
media's presence during the execution of a search warrant is a per se violation
of the Fourth Amendment. In Part II, this Note will provide the relevant Fourth
Amendment background, including the Fourth Amendment's threshold
requirements, and discuss the cases that have addressed the issue of media
presence during the execution of a search warrant. In Part I, it will show that
the Fourth Amendment is implicated when the media accompanies law
enforcement officials during the execution of a search warrant because citizens
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes. In Part IV, this Note
will show that members of the media become "state actors" when they
accompany law enforcement officials during the execution of a search warrant
implicating Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness. In Part V, it will
demonstrate that the media's presence during the execution of a search warrant
is unreasonable under Fourth Amendment standards and is a per se violation of
the Fourth Amendment. Finally, this Note will show that both media members
and law enforcement officials who partake in such joint activities are liable for
violating the constitutional right-to be free from unreasonable searches and
seizures-of the individual whose home is searched.
The property and privacy rights of such individuals do not vanish the moment they
become subjects of a warrant. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment requires that such rights
not be obliterated during searches and seizures, but preserved to the maximum extent
consistent with the public's interest in community safety and crime control. What makes
televised home searches unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment is not only that they
fail to satisfy this requirement, but also that they involve police authorization of unlawful
conduct by third parties.
Id. Ransom even viewed the Ayeni decision as a warning to media crews and law
enforcement officials regarding concerted action between the police and the media. See id. at
357. With the recent Eighth Circuit opinion in Parker v. Boyer, however, one must question
how serious Ransom's warning should be taken. This Note will, by providing methodical
Fourth Amendment analysis, show that, despite the Eighth Circuit's opinion, law enforcement
officials and media members should still heed Ransom's warning and discontinue joint
enterprises that involve invasions of private homes. See id. In so doing, this Note aims to fill
the void that has been left by the courts and commentators who have addressed the issue of
media presence during the execution of a search warrant.
14 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
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II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment's History and Purpose
The Fourth Amendment 15 is one of the most litigated 16 yet least understood
provisions in the Bill of Rights. 17 Although the Fourth Amendment contains
confusing and ambiguous language, it has been settled that "physical entry of
the home is the chief evil against which the wording of the Fourth Amendment
is directed,"' 8 and that the clear purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect
the home from unreasonable government intrusions. 19
15 The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
16 See BRADFORD P. WILSON, ENFORCING THE FouRTH AMENDMN: A
JURISPRUDENTIAL HISTORY 1 (1986). Although the Fourth Amendment has the virtue of
brevity, its language is often characterized as ambiguous and opaque. See id. at 2. Fourth
Amendment scholars often blame the undisciplined and confusing development of Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence on the Amendment's general terms; however, the same scholars
believe that the Fourth Amendment is necessary to preserve and foster civil liberty. See id. at
3.
17 "No area of constitutional decision making has generated more difficult decisions for
the Court than the area of search and seizure." DARIEN A. MCWHIRmTER, SEARCH, SEIZURE,
AND PRIVACY ix (1994). In fact, the Fourth Amendment is often considered the most
ambiguous, complex, and confusing amendment enumerated in the Bill of Rights. See id. at
1.
18 United States v. United States Dist. Ct., 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); see also Payton v.
New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1980) (Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent a
broader evil than just the abuse of general warrants); Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S.
505, 511 (1961) (very core of the Fourth Amendment is the right to retreat to home and be
free from unreasonable government intrusion). The sanctity of the home is probably the most
certain fact that underlies Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See James J. Tomkovicz,
Beyond Secrecy for Secrecy's Sake: Toward an Erpanded Vision of the Fourth Amendment
Privacy Province, 36 HASTINGS L.J. 645, 674 n.120 (1985) ("The sanctity of the home
remains today probably the most unassailable fact of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.").
19 See 2 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIZuRE, § 19:3, at 4 (2d ed. 1993). A
major cause of the American Revolution was the English Government's use of general
warrants. See McW-mTER, supra note 17, at 2-3. Since general warrants granted
government officials the ability to go anywhere with complete immunity, any piece of private
property could be entered and searched with a general warrant. See id. at 2. In response to the
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In order to protect the home, Fourth Amendment jurisprudence prescribes
that a warrantless physical entry into a home by a government actor is
presumptively unreasonable, 20 and that a physical entry into a home by a
government actor pursuant to a valid search warrant must be executed within
reasonable bounds of intensity and duration.21 Therefore, law enforcement
officers executing a search warrant must enter the home,22 execute the
general warrants, the First Congress of the United States, after the ratification of the United
States Constitution, adopted the Fourth Amendment with little debate and after only minor
changes to James Madison's proposed original. See id. at 2-3. "[he decision to include the
Fourth Amendment in the Bill of Rights appears to have been inevitable in light of the
historical context." Ransom, supra note 3, at 332 (footnote omitted).
20 See 2 HALL, supra note 19, § 19:2, at 4. Police have a heavy burden when trying to
justify a warrantless entry into a home. See id. "For example, true hot pursuit of an accused
robber justifies a warrantless entry, but hot pursuit of a DUI suspect does not." Id. (footnote
omitted). "[he Supreme Court has consistently ruled that a home, whatever shape it takes,
is protected from unreasonable invasion by the government. That means in most cases the
government must have a warrant before invading the sanctity of the home." McWHIaTER,
supra note 17, at 34. "[I]n a doubtful or marginal case a search under a warrant may be
sustainable where without one it would fall." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 106
(1965) (citing Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980)).
21 See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEuRE, § 4.10(d), at 670-81 (3d ed. 1996).
The police are not completely free to execute a search warrant in any manner they choose.
See id. at 674. The intensity of the search is determined by the items that are to be seized, see
id. at 670, and the duration of the search is determined by when the purposes of the warrant
have been carried out, see id. at 678. The model rules for search warrant execution also
demonstrate that police should and must act reasonably when they enter a home pursuant to a
search warrant. See MODEL RuLEs FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT: SEARCH WARRANT ExECuTIoN
commentary at 14 (Project on Law Enforcement Policy and Rulemaking, Approved Draft
1974) [hereinafter, MODEL RuLEs] ("In warrant execution it is necessary to strike a balance
between the need for official intrusion for the valid public purpose of criminal law
enforcement, and the personal interest of those who have been intruded upon in the security
and privacy of their premises.").
For discussion on the history and law of search warrant execution, see generally G.
Robert Blakey, The Rule of Announcement and Unlawfid Entry: Miller v. United States and
Ker v. California, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1964) (analyzing the legal history of government
entrance into private dwellings from common law to 18 U.S.C. § 3109 to Supreme Court and
state court decisions); Michael R. Sonnenreich & Stanley Ebner, No-Knock and Nonsense, An
Alleged Constitutional Problem, 44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 626 (1970) (tracing legal history of
knock and announce laws including state and federal legislation).
22 See MODEL Rulms, supra note 21, Rule 206. Rule 206 provides, in part: "Entering
the premises in order to conduct a search shall be done in as courteous and non-destructive a
manner as is practicable." Id., Rule 206, at 8. This rule is proposed because every effort
should be made to minimize or avoid hostility when executing a search warrant since it is a
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search,23 and conduct themselves in a reasonable and professional manner.24 In
light of the fact that the Fourth Amendment was adopted primarily to protect
the sanctity of the home25 and in light of the fact that police officers must
minimize the intrusion suffered by individuals when executing a search
warrant,26 the question rapidly arises: Under the Fourth Amendment, is it
unreasonable for the media to accompany the police, into an individual's private
home, during the execution of a valid search warrant?
government agency that intrudes upon an individual's privacy when it executes a search
warrant. See id., Rule 206 commentary at 31; see also 18 U.S.C. § 3109 (1994) (knock and
announce rule for search warrant execution).
23 See MODEL RuLES, supra note 21, Rules 301 and 302, at 8-9, commentary at 33-34.
Rule 301, Search Progression, provides that once the site of a search is secured, the search
should be conducted in an orderly progression. See id., Rule 301, at 8-9. The reason for
requiring an orderly progression is that the physical intrusion is minimized and the time
expended during the search is kept to a minimum. See id., Rule 301 commentary at 33. Rule
302, Scope of the Search, provides: "The area of the search is limited by the description of
the premises in the warrant. The scope of the search within that area is limited by the type of
item(s) listed in the warrant." Id., Rule 302, at 9. This rule reveals the premise that police are
not given carte blanche permission to conduct general exploratory searches of homes. See id.,
Rule 302 commentary at 34 (citing United States v. Pardo-Bolland, 229 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1964)).
24 See id., Rule 304, at 9-10, commentary at 35-36. Rule 304, Proper Conduct During
the Search, provides:
Searching shall be conducted in as courteous and non-destructive a manner as
possible, and any disarray caused by the search shall be minimized before the search
team leaves.
[If the time and the place of the search are such as to arouse public curiosity, a
uniformed officer should be assigned to answer bystanders' inquiries and to control
access to the search site.]
Id., Rule 304, at 9-10 (brackets in original) (emphasis added). The purpose of this rle is to
insure that the police make every effort to minimize the impact of the intrusion. See id., Rule
304 commentary at 36.
2 5 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 549 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (Fourth
Amendment "embraces the concept of the privacy of the home"); Frank v. Maryland, 359
U.S. 360, 363 (1959) (history of Fourth Amendment specifically demonstrates it was
designed to protect the home), overruled in part by Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523
(1967); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626-27 (1886) (purpose of the Fourth
Amendment is to prevent arbitrary government intrusion of the home).
26 See, e.g., Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1979) (police may justify
damage to property when damage was necessary to perform duty; the standard is
reasonableness).
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B. The Fourth Amendment's Two Threshold Requirements
Two threshold requirements must be satisfied before the Fourth
Amendment's standards of reasonableness are applicable to a particular
situation. 27 First, the conduct must intrude into an area where the citizen holds
a reasonable expectation of privacy. 28 Second, as with all the provisions of the
Bill of Rights, the conduct must be governmental. 29 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment's standards of reasonableness only apply to situations where the
government invades an area where the citizen may and does reasonably expect
privacy.30
1. The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy Threshold
"The touchstone of Fourth Amendment analysis is whether a person has a
'constitutionally protected expectation of privacy.' 31 A reasonable expectation
2 7 See ROBERT M. BLOOM & MARK S. BRODIN, CRIIlNAL PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 19 (2d ed. 1996). The issue of whether these threshold requirements are
actually satisfied when the media accompanies the police during the execution of a search
warrant at an individual's home will be discussed infra Parts m.-IV.
28 See BLooM & BRODIN, supra note 27, at 19. A Fourth Amendment search does not
occur unless the person subjected to the search has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
place searched. See 1 JOHN WESLEY HALL, JR., SEARCH AND SEIU , § 2:1, at 40 (2d ed.
1991).
2 9 See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 2:1, at 40. Private searches, unlike government
searches, do not implicate the Fourth Amendment. See id. § 12:1, at 549.
30 See id.
31 Id. § 2:1, at 39 (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) ("mhe Fourth
Amendment protects legitimate expectations of privacy rather than simply places. If the
inspection by police does not intrude upon a legitimate expectation of privacy there is no
'search' subject to the Warrant Clause.")).
The Court's early cases on the scope of the interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment followed a meandering course from a liberal application of the doctrine of
trespass which protected the rights of privacy, personal security, and private property to
a flirtation with the underpinnings of the concept of reasonable expectation of privacy to
rigid unrealistic adherence to the concept of physical trespass.
Id. § 2:2, at 40-41 (footnotes omitted). The Supreme Court recognized the "first seeds of the
expectation of privacy" in Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727 (1878), when it determined that
sealed letters could not be opened and inspected without a warrant because sealed letters are
"'intended to be kept free from inspection.'" 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 2:2, at 42 (quoting Ex
parte Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733). Finally, Justice Harlan, in his concurring opinion in Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967), "captured what became the essence of the
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of privacy exists when a person demonstrates a subjective expectation of
privacy 32 that society is willing to recognize as reasonable. 33
Therefore, the first requirement for Fourth Amendment protection is that
the individual seeking Fourth Amendment protection have a subjective
expectation of privacy. 34 The subjective expectation of privacy requirement is
met when "the individual has shown that 'he seeks to preserve [something] as
private.' '35 This subjective expectation of privacy requirement can be easily
'reasonable expectation of privacy' standard as he perceived it and as it should be." 1 HALL,
supra note 28, § 2:4, at 51. Since Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz, a majority of the
Court has adopted Harlan's reasonable expectation of privacy analysis which requires an
expectation of privacy to be both subjectively and objectively reasonable to receive Fourth
Amendment protection. See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
For discussion on the reasonable expectation of privacy requirement, see generally
Richard G. Wilkins, Defining the "Reasonable Expectation of Privacy" An Emerging
Tripartite Analysis, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1077, 1128 (1987) (stating that in determining
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists "the Court looks to (1) the place or
location where official surveillance occurs, (2) the nature and degree of intrusiveness of the
surveillance itself, and (3) the object or goal of the surveillance."); Gerald G. Ashdown, The
Fourth Amendment and the "Legitimate Expectation of Privacy", 34 VAND. L. REV. 1289
(1981) (stating that the Court uses a privacy hierarchy to examine Fourth Amendment issues,
according full Fourth Amendment protection when recognizing reasonable expectation of
privacy, to no Fourth Amendment protection when failing to recognize reasonable expectation
of privacy).
32 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In determining whether a
subjective expectation of privacy exists, the inquiry is "whether the individual, by his
conduct, has 'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.'" Smith, 442 U.S. at 740
(quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
3 3 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In determining whether society is
willing to recognize a subjective expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable, the question
is whether "the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 'justifiable' under the
circumstances." Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353).
34 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
3 5 Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351) (alteration in original). The
Supreme Court has only addressed the subjective expectation of privacy in a few cases. See 1
HALL, supra note 28, § 2:6, at 56. The Supreme Court, acknowledging shortcomings and
complications within the subjective expectation of privacy requirement, "ultimately adopted
the rationale that the Fourth Amendment is to be construed in 'light of contemporary norms
and conditions.'" Id. (quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 591 n.33 (1980)).
Furthermore, "[i]n seeking to resolve whether an individual manifested a reasonable
expectation of privacy, it must be determined whether he 'took normal precautions to
maintain his privacy.'" Id. (quoting Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980)).
Therefore, "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office,
is not a subject of the Fourth Amendment." Katz, 389 U.S. at 351.
For discussion on the subjective expectation of privacy, see Anthony G. Amsterdam,
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satisfied because, in most instances, it is not difficult to prove that a person has
taken the normal precautions to maintain her privacy. 36
Once a subjective expectation of privacy is established, a second
requirement must be met for a reasonable expectation of privacy to exist.37 The
subjective expectation of privacy must be an expectation of privacy that
"society is prepared to recognize as reasonable." 38 To examine whether the
subjective expectation of privacy is one society recognizes as reasonable, the
Court examines the beliefs and norms of contemporary society. 39
The first threshold for Fourth Amendment analysis-a reasonable
expectation of privacy-really involves two separate determinations. First, there
must be a subjective expectation of privacy. Second, the subjective expectation
of privacy must be objectively reasonable. Only when both of these
requirements are satisfied is the first threshold to Fourth Amendment analysis
and protection fulfilled.40
Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349, 384 (1974) (arguing the
subjective expectation of privacy has no place in Fourth Amendment analysis because the
government can easily destroy a subjective expectation of privacy prior to a search by simply
announcing its intentions to conduct a search).
36 See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 2:6, at 56. The hope that something will not be found
or discovered, however, is not a reasonable expectation of privacy. See id. at 56 n.16 (citing
United States v. Sarda-Villa, 760 F.2d 1232, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 1985); United States v.
Oliver, 657 F.2d 85, 87 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 459 U.S. 1168 (1983), aft'd, 466 U.S.
170 (1984); State v. Drumbiller, 675 P.2d 631, 632-33 (Wash. Ct. App. 1984)). "A
legitimate expectation of privacy means more than the subjective expectation of not being
discovered." Drtmhiller, 675 P.2d at 632-33.
37 See BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 27, at 26. "It is not enough, in other words, for the
target of the intrusion to believe that he is acting in private; that belief must be deemed
reasonable." Id.
38 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Therefore, the second requirement for
Fourth Amendment protection is met when "the individual's expectation, viewed objectively,
is 'justifiable' under the circumstances." Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at
353).
39 See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 2:7, at 60-61. The Supreme Court has held that society
recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in a desk, filing cabinet, or the home of a host.
See id. at 60-62. Society, however, does not recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy,
according to the Supreme Court, in moving vehicles, open fields, or public areas. See id.
40 "In analyzing the issue of whether a 'search' implicating the Fourth Amendment has
occurred... attention must be paid to both the setting observed and the vantage point from
which the observation is made. Those factors weigh heavily in the determination of which
privacy expectations are 'reasonable.'" BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 27, at 33.
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2. The Government Action Threshold
"The Fourth Amendment applies only to action by the government, not to
private conduct." 41 Therefore, the government action threshold is easily
fulfilled when the actor is a federal, state, or local government official.42 The
requirement is easily unfulfilled when the actor is a private party acting
independent of government policy, authority, direction, or acquiescence. 43 A
search by a private actor is not necessarily, however, a private search.44 A
search by a private actor is within the coverage of the Fourth Amendment, if
the search is conducted pursuant to official government policy or at the
direction of a government agent.45 Furthermore, a private search is also
41 Id. at 19. "One of the oldest principles in the law of search and seizure holds that
searches by private or non-law enforcement personnel are not limited by the Fourth
Amendment regardless of the unlawful manner in which the search may have been
conducted." 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 12:1, at 549 (citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S.
465 (1921)).
In Burdeau v. McDowell, private individuals illegally entered McDowell's office,
searched McDowell's office, and seized some of McDowell's papers. See Burdeau v.
McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 470-71, 472-74 (1921). The papers were given to a government
prosecutor who intended to use the papers in a criminal trial against McDowell. See id. at
470. The Court held that the papers could be used as evidence by the government because the
government did not play a role in the search of McDowell's office. See id. at 476. The Fourth
Amendment's "origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the
activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies." Id.
For discussion on private searches and the Burdeau v. McDowell decision, see Forrest
R. Black, Burdeau v. McDowall [sic]-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to Absolutism, 12 B.
U. L. REv. 32, 39 (1931) (stating that the Burdeau opinion, by technically examining the
Fourth Amendment, has allowed for the creation of civilian law enforcement organizations
immune from constitutional standards).
42 See BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 27, at 19-20. The Fourth Amendment covers not
only conduct by law enforcement officials, but also conduct by civil authorities. See id. at 20
n.2 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (state hospital supervisor limited by
Fourth Amendment); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (principal at a public
school limited by Fourth Amendment)).
43 See id. at 20.
44 The terms "public search" and "private search" are used to distinguish between those
searches that are covered by the Fourth Amendment-public searches-and those searches
that are not covered by the Fourth Amendment-private searches. See 1 HALL, supra note 28,
§ 12:1, at 549-50.
45 See BLOOM & BRODIN, supra note 27, at 20. "When a private individual acts at the
direction of a government agent or pursuant to an official policy, the search will be deemed
public and consequently within the coverage of the [Fourth] Amendment." Id.
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considered public and under the rubric of the Fourth Amendment when there is
governmental acquiescence in the private party's conduct.46 Therefore, the
government action threshold can be fulfilled by government actors conducting
the search,47 by government actors directing or facilitating private actors in a
search,48 or by government actors acquiescing in a search conducted by private
actors.49
C. Case History of Media Presence During the Execution of a Search
Warrant
1. The Second Circuit's Approach in Ayeni v. Mottola50
On March 5, 1992, Special Agent Mottola, a United States Secret Service
agent, obtained a search warrant that authorized Mottola and any authorized
officer of the United States to enter and search the Ayenis' apartment for
evidence of credit card fraud. 51 When Mottola arrived at the Ayenis'
apartment, he was accompanied by three other Secret Service agents and by a
46 See id. In determining whether a private individual's conduct, in the absence of direct
governmental command or policy, is subject to Fourth Amendment standards, courts
examine: (1) the amount of government encouragement, knowledge, or acquiescence in
regard to the private actor's conduct; and (2) the purpose of the private party's conduct (was
the private party pursuing a government interest or a private interest). See id. at 20-21. A
purely private search can be transformed into a public search and can subsequently become
subject to Fourth Amendment standards and limitations when a government actor, upon
receiving information from the private actor, exceeds the private actor's prior search. See id.
47 See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment applicable to both
federal government and state and local government actors).
48 See, e.g., Comgold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (evidence suppressed
because government officers either participated in private search or private actor conducted
search at government officer's request); United States v. Stein, 322 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Ill.
1971) (evidence obtained by informant suppressed because police encouraged informant to
gather evidence); State v. Riser, 294 S.E.2d 461 (W. Va. 1982) (police may not direct a
private search and escape Fourth Amendment).
49 See, e.g., United States v. Mekjian, 505 F.2d 1320, 1327-28 (5th Cir. 1975)
(government knowledge and tacit approval of private search invokes Fourth Amendment
protection); M.J. v. State, 399 So.2d 996, 998 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) ("When a law
enforcement officer... acquiesces in a search conducted by private parties, that search must
comport with usual constitutional standards.").
50 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
51 See id. at 683. The search warrant was obtained on the basis of information given by
an informant that suggested Babatande Ayeni was engaging in credit card fraud. See id.
Plaintiffs in the case were Ayeni's wife and son. See id.
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three-member CBS television crew. 52 The CBS television crew followed
Mottola and the other agents into the apartment and recorded the search with
video and audio equipment. 53 Mrs. Ayeni protested the videotaping, but the
CBS television crew, with the permission and support of the Secret Service,
continued to videotape the search.54 The television crew videotaped Mrs.
Ayeni's face, the agents' questioning of Mrs. Ayeni, and the Ayenis' personal
effects located throughout the apartment. 55 In all, the television crew
videotaped the search for approximately twenty minutes before leaving the
apartment with some of the Secret Service agents. 56
Mrs. Ayeni and her son sued CBS and Mottola for violating their
constitutional right-to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures-
during the execution of the search warrant.57 CBS and Mottola moved to
dismiss the suit on the theory of qualified immunity. 58 The district court denied
both CBS's and Mottola's motions to dismiss. 59
52 See id. Mottola arrived at the Ayeni apartment after other Secret Service agents had
entered and begun to search the apartment. See id. In fact, the agents that arrived before
Mottola searched the apartment without the warrant Mottola had obtained. See id.
Apparently, Agent Mottola allowed the CBS television crew to enter the Ayeni home simply
for the purpose of producing a story about credit card fraud for the CBS news show Street
Stories. See Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E.D.N.Y. 1994), order aff'd sub
nom. Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994). In fact, one of the Secret Service agents,
during the search of the apartment, gave CBS an interview, while he was in the Ayenis'
foyer, regarding the motives and methods of people who commit credit card fraud. See id.
53 See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 683.
54 See id.
55 See id. During the search, Kayode Ayeni, Mrs. Ayeni's son, cried and told his
mother he was frightened. See id. When Mrs. Ayeni tried to cover her face with a magazine,
a Secret Service agent grabbed the magazine from Mrs. Ayeni and instructed the television
crew to videotape her face. See id.
56 See id. at 684.
57 See id.; see also Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. 362 (E.D.N.Y. 1994). The
Ayenis also named the producer for the CBS show in their complaint, see Ayeni v. CBS,
Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 364, but for simplicity the parties will just be referred to as CBS and
Mottola.
58 See Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 364. Under qualified immunity, government
officials, performing their discretionary duties, are immune from civil liability unless: (1)
their conduct violates "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person should have known," Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); or
(2) it was unreasonable for the government officials to believe their conduct did not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights, see Finnegan v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817,
823 (2d Cir. 1990).
59 See Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 368. The trial court noted that even if CBS
was entitled to the qualified immunity defense, the complaint filed by the Ayenis alleged a
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Mottola challenged the trial court's decision by filing an interlocutory
appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 60 The
Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision concluding that the Ayenis'
complaint sufficiently alleged Fourth Amendment violations that were capable
of withstanding a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. 61 The Second
Circuit, in addressing Mottola's qualified immunity defense, advanced a two-
part analysis. 62 First, the court determined that clearly established Fourth
Amendment principles prohibited Mottola from bringing the CBS television
crew into the Ayenis' apartment. 63 Second, the court determined that "an
violation of a then clearly established constitutional right precluding the grant of qualified
immunity. See id. The district court stated:
As a Secret Service Agent, Agent Mottola was authorized by law to execute search
warrants. 18 U.S.C. sec. 3056(c)(1)(A). His power was limited by restrictions
established by Congress and by the Constitution. The action of Agent Mottola-arguably
at this stage in the proceeding-was so far from then well established acceptable
constitutional behavior that no case law precedent was needed to alert him to the fact that
the execution of a warrant for the benefit of private persons violated the Constitution.
Id. at 368. The trial court, in finding a clearly established Fourth Amendment prohibition
against granting the media access to an individual's home, referred to and cited to numerous
cases that demonstrate: (1) interruption of privacy is to be minimized under the Fourth
Amendment, see, e.g., Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927); (2) searches must be
closely tailored to the purpose of the warrant and not overly destructive, see, e.g., United
States v. Becker, 929 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1991); and (3) the government shall not invade the
privacy of the home without good cause, see, e.g., Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204
(1981). See Ayeni v. CBS, Inc., 848 F. Supp. at 366.
60 See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 684. CBS did not appeal the trial court's decision
because CBS entered into a confidential settlement with the Ayenis. See id. at 684 n.2.
61 See id. at 691.
62 See id. at 684-88. The court stated that Mottola, to be successful in his claim of
qualified immunity, would have to demonstrate that either the rights claimed by the Ayenis
were not clearly established at the time the search warrant was executed or that it was
objectively reasonable for him to believe that his conduct did not violate the clearly
established rights asserted by the Ayenis. See id. at 684 (citing Soares v. Connecticut, 8 F.3d
917, 920 (2d Cir. 1993) (to establish qualified immunity, one must show either conduct did
not violate clearly established rights which a reasonable person would have known or it was
objectively reasonable to believe conduct did not violate clearly established rights); Finnegan
v. Fountain, 915 F.2d 817, 823 (2d Cir. 1990) (same)).
63 See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 684-86.
[C]ourt decisions have repeatedly made clear that law enforcement officers conducting
searches under a warrant are limited in their conduct to either (a) actions expressly
authorized by the warrant, or (b) such further actions as are impliedly authorized because
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objectively reasonable officer could not have concluded that inviting a television
crew... to participate in a search was in accordance with Fourth Amendment
requirements. " 64 The court noted that allowing the media to enter a private
citizen's home, during the execution of a search warrant, needlessly magnifies
the impairment of the citizen's right to privacy without any justification based
on the legitimate needs of law enforcement.65 The court went on to state that
the media's presence, during the execution of a search warrant, is "calculated
to inflict injury on the very value that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect-
they are reasonably related to accomplishing the search authorized by the warrant or
accomplishing additional legitimate law enforcement objectives, such as insuring the
safety of the searching officers and effectively responding as law enforcement officers to
circumstances that might arise during the course of the search.
Id. at 685 (footnotes omitted).
The court acknowledged that there was no reported case on point that prohibited law
enforcement officials from bringing members of the media into a home during the execution
of a search warrant, but the court still concluded that clearly established Fourth Amendment
principles prohibited Mottola from allowing the CBS television crew to enter the Ayenis'
home. See id. at 686. "Mottola exceeded well-established principles when he brought into the
Ayeni home persons who were neither authorized by the warrant to be there nor serving any
legitimate law enforcement purpose by being there. A private home is not a soustage for
law enforcement theatricals." Id. at 686 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
64 Id. at 686. The court stated: "The contours of the Ayenis' rights were 'sufficiently
clear that a reasonable official [in Mottola's position] would understand that what he [was]
doing violate[d] th[ose] right[s].'" Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987)).
65 See id. at 686. "The purpose of bringing the CBS camera crew into the Ayenis' home
was to permit public broadcast of their private premises and thus to magnify needlessly the
impairment of their right to privacy." Id. The court also reinforced its decision by discussing
18 U.S.C. § 3105:
"A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its
direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other
person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its
execution."
Id. at 687 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988)) (emphasis added). The court, however, noted
that its rejection of Mottola's qualified immunity defense rested on Fourth Amendment
principles and that 18 U.S.C. § 3105 was just a reinforcement of their rejection. See id. This
Note will not focus on 18 U.S.C. § 3105 because the aim of this Note is to demonstrate that
the Second Circuit was correct when it concluded the Fourth Amendment itself prohibits the
media from accompanying the police into an individual's home during the execution of a
search warrant.
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the right of privacy." 66
2. The Eighth Circuit's Approach in Parker v. Boyer 67
On February 9, 1994, Boyer, a police officer with the St. Louis Police
Department, executed a search warrant at the Parkers' residence.68 Boyer,
accompanied by a KSDK television crew, 69 executed the search warrant at the
Parker residence with other members of the St. Louis Police Department.70 The
KSDK television crew followed the police into the Parkers' home, filmed the
search of the home, and subsequently televised the video of the search of the
Parkers' home during local newscasts. 7 1
The Parkers sued KSDK72 and Boyer73 asserting, among other things, that
KSDK and Boyer violated their Fourth Amendment rights when KSDK entered
66 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686. Other courts have since followed the Second
Circuit's decision inAyeni v. Mottola. See, e.g., Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 356 (4th
Cir. 1995) ("[W]e have no doubt that the Fourth Amendment prohibits agents from allowing
a search warrant to be used to facilitate a private individual's independent search of another's
home for items unrelated to those specified in the warrant."); Hagler v. Philadelphia
Newspapers, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-2154, 1996 WL 408605, at *2 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1996)
("A reasonable person would know that the purpose of a warrant is to facilitate proper law-
enforcement, not to provide a 'photo opportunity.' A search warrant is simply not a press
pass.").
67 93 F.3d 445, 446 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997).
68 See Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. 638, 640 (E.D. Mo. 1995), rev'd in part sub
nom. Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997).
The target of the search warrant was Travis Martin, a relative of the Parkers, who was living
in the Parkers' home. See id. at 641. Martin was detained outside the Parkers' home before
the police entered the house and executed the search warrant. See id.
69 See id. at 641. KSDK was a local television station that contacted the St. Louis Police
Department in an effort to produce a news segment about police efforts to combat illegal
weapons. See id. KSDK was assigned to ride on patrol with Officer Boyer on the day Boyer
decided to execute the warrant at the Parkers' home. See id. When the KSDK film crew was
assigned to ride with Officer Boyer, St. Louis Police officials did not know Officer Boyer was
going to serve the search warrant at the Parker residence that night. See id.70 See id. at 640.
71 See id. at 641. In fact, the KSDK television crew accompanied some of the same
police officers during the execution of another search warrant after they left the Parkers'
home. See id. KSDK broadcasted the video of both searches on local newscasts. See id. The
video of the search of the Parkers' home was broadcasted on three occasions. See id.
72 The actual name of the defendant was Multi-Media KSDK, Inc. See id. at 640.
73 Other police officers and police officials were named as defendants in the Parkers'
lawsuit, see id., but for simplicity this Note will refer to Boyer as the representative defendant
of all the police.
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their home during the execution of the search warrant. 74 The Parkers, KSDK,
and Boyer made cross motions for summary judgment. 75 The district court
granted the Parkers' motion for summary judgment on their Fourth
Amendment claim against Boyer,76 but granted KSDK's motion for summary
judgment on all counts against the Parkers.77
On review, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's granting of
summary judgment in favor of KSDK.78 The court, however, reversed the
district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of the Parkers against
Officer Boyer and held that Boyer was entitled to qualified immunity. 79
In affirming the district court's conclusion that KSDK was not a state actor,
the Eighth Circuit concluded: "It is undisputed that KSDK acted independently
74 See id.
75 See id. at 640.
76 See id. at 646. In granting the Parkers' motion for summary judgment against Boyer,
the district court relied heavily on Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), concluding
that:
the rationale and conclusions of Ayeni yield not only a determination that the officers
responsible for the KSDK personnel's presence in the plaintiff's home are not entitled to
qualified immunity, but yield further the determination as a matter of law that plaintiffs
are entitled to summary judgment as to liability on their Fourth Amendment claim.
Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. at 643-44.
77 See Parker v. Clarke, 905 F. Supp. at 643-44. In granting KSDK's motion for
summary judgment, the district court concluded that KSDK was not a state actor and,
therefore, could not be liable, as a matter of law, for an alleged violation of the Parkers'
Fourth Amendment rights. See id. at 641-43. The court reasoned that there was no "mutual
understanding or purpose on the part of the KSDK personnel and the police officers who
conducted the search." Id. at 642. The KSDK television crew was simply riding along with
Officer Boyer. See id. "The passivity of this circumstance demonstrates the absence of any
affirmative agreement between KSDK and the police concerning particular conduct of KSDK
which plaintiffs now challenge." Id. Furthermore, the two distinct purposes of KSDK and the
police, according to the court, support the conclusion that KSDK was not a state actor. See id.
The KSDK personnel were present for the purpose of gathering news and preparing a
report for broadcast. The police were engaged in the conduct of law enforcement
activity. The police did not participate in the filming of the objects and events in the
house, and the KSDK personnel did not participate in the execution of the search.
Id. (footnote omitted).
78 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081
(1997).
79 See id. at 446.
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of the police in deciding to enter the house and videotape the event(s) there and
that neither KSDK nor the police assisted the other in the performance of their
separate and respective tasks." °80 The Eighth Circuit noted that KSDK's
decision to trespass during the execution of the search warrant did not
transform KSDK into a state actor. 81
In reversing the district court's granting of summary judgment in favor of
the Parkers against Boyer,82 the Eighth Circuit held that Boyer was entitled to
qualified immunity because he did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right.83 The Eighth Circuit stated that most courts, contrary to the Second
Circuit, "have rejected the argument that the United States Constitution forbids
the media to encroach on a person's property while the police search it."84
80 Id. at 448.
81 See id. Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold concurred in the court's decision, but dissented
on the issue of whether KSDK was a state actor. See id. at 448-49 (Arnold, C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Chief Judge Arnold concluded that KSDK acted in concert with
the St. Louis Police Department and that KSDK was, in fact, a state actor when it entered the
Parkers' home. See id. at 449 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). KSDK
"came to the location with the police and could not have entered if the police had not done so
first. They [KSDK] did not simply happen along the street at the time that a search was being
conducted." Id. (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). KSDK "were
'willful participant[s] in joint activity with the State or its agents.'" Id. (Arnold, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (quoting Adickes v. S.H.
Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970)).82 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 446.
83 See id.
84 Id. The cases cited by the Eighth Circuit do not provide strong support for the
contention that most courts have held the Constitution does not forbid the media from
accompanying the police during the execution of a search warrant at an individual's home.
The Eighth Circuit cited the following cases: Avenson v. Zegart, 577 F. Supp. 958 (D. Minn.
1984); Moncrief v. Hanton, 10 Med. L. Rep. 1620 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Higbee v. Times-
Advocate, 5 Med. L. Rep. 2372 (S.D. Cal. 1980); Prahl v. Brosamle, 295 N.W.2d 768
(Wis. Ct. App. 1980). See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 447.
In Avenson v. Zegart, the operator of a puppy mill sued various public officials for
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Avenson, 577 F.
Supp. at 962. The public officials told the media that they would be executing a search
warrant at the Avenson residence. See id. at 960. When the warrant was executed, members
of the media were present at the Avenson residence. See id. The public officials refused to
remove the media members upon Avenson's request to do so. See id. The media members
never entered the Avenson home, as they covered the search for animal cruelty from outside.
See id. In addressing Avenson's Fourteenth Amendment claim, the district court, in granting
summary judgment for the public officials, stated: "Plaintiffs have failed to establish a valid
equal protection claim pursuant to the fourteenth amendment since they do not allege that they
are members of a discrete and insular minority or that they were treated differently from
similarly situated individuals." Id. at 962. In fact, the court in Avenson never addressed the
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Therefore, according to the Eighth Circuit, Boyer did not violate a clearly
established constitutional right when he allowed KSDK crew members to
accompany him during the execution of the search warrant at the Parkers'
home.85
The Eighth Circuit concluded that the Ayeni 86 and Buonocore 87 decisions
were irrelevant to the determination of the qualified immunity issue because the
cases were decided after Boyer executed the search at the Parker residence. 88
The court stated that even if the two cases were entitled to consideration, "they
issue of whether or not the media's presence was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
See id. The only Fourth Amendment claim present in Avenson was whether the Fourth
Amendment was violated when public officials went to the Avenson residence to discuss
allegations with Avenson and discovered the puppy mill. See id. at 961-62. This initial visit to
the Avenson residence is what subsequently produced the search warrant. See id.
In Moncrief v. Hanton and Higbee v. hnes-Advocate, United States District Court
judges agreed that the media's presence during the execution of a search warrant at an
individual's home does not violate the narrow constitutional right to privacy. See Moncrief 10
Med. L. Rep. at 1622; Higbee, 5 Med. L. Rep. at 2372. Neither judge, however, examined
whether the media's presence violated the residents' Fourth Amendment rights to be free
from unreasonable searches because neither plaintiff alleged this specific Fourth Amendment
violation. See Moncrief, 10 Med. L. Rep. at 1621-22; Higbee, 5 Med. L. Rep. at 2372. Th'd
plaintiffs in both cases simply alleged a general violation of a constitutional right to privacy.
See Moncrief, 10 Med. L. Rep. at 1621-22; Higbee, 5 Med. L. Rep. at 2372-73.
In Prahl v. Brosamle, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals stated: "We are unwilling to
accept the proposition that the filming and television broadcast of a reasonable search and
seizure, without more, result in unreasonableness." Prahl v. Brosamle, 278 N.W.2d at 774. It
is unclear whether the media actually entered the home in the Prahl case. See id. at 773. It is
clear, however, that the media in Prahl did not enter the residence behind the police or cover
the entire search of the Prahl residence. See id.
From this brief discussion of the cases cited by the Eighth Circuit, it can be seen that the
cases do not strongly support the Eighth Circuit's position, especially since the Eighth Circuit
was facing circumstances where the plaintiff was asserting a specific Fourth Amendment
claim and where the media accompanied the police into the Parkers' home and filmed the
entire search. Furthermore, the Second Circuit had already decided Ayeni and the Fourth
Circuit, in Buonocore, had already followed the principles outlined in Ayeni. See supra note
66 and accompanying text.
85 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 447. "[W]e cannot say that the kind of conduct in
which the police engaged in this case was a violation of a clearly established constitutional
principle of which the police, at the time they executed their search warrant, should have been
aware." Id.
86 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994).
87 Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995); see supra note 66 and
accompanying text (discussing how the Fourth Circuit followed the principles of the Second
Circuit's Ayeni opinion).
88 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 447.
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would appear... to indicate at most only the beginnings of a trend in the law"
and not a clearly established constitutional principle. 89 The court went on to
state that it did not "think it self-evident that the police offend general fourth-
amendment principles when they allow members of the, news media to enter
someone's house during the execution of a search warrant." 90
89 Id.
90 Id. The Eighth Circuit's decision to grant Boyer qualified immunity is, at least,
understandable because no court had specifically held that the media's entrance into a private
citizen's home, during the execution of a search warrant, violated the Fourth Amendment
before Boyer allowed the KSDK television crew to enter the Parkers' home. Therefore, one
can understand the argument that Boyer did not violate a clearly established constitutional
right when he allowed the KSDK television crew to enter the Parkers' home. The Eighth
Circuit's position that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by media presence, however, is
incomprehensible. Judge Rosenbaum, a district court judge sitting by designation, agreed. See
id. at 445, 448 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring specially). Judge Rosenbaum concurred that
Boyer was entitled to qualified immunity, but stated that the court should clearly establish,
consistent with the Ayeni decision, "that police officials executing a search warrant violate a
resident's Fourth Amendment rights, when they admit representatives of the public media into
a private citizen's home, without first securing the resident's express consent." Id. at 448
(Rosenbaum, J., concurring specially). Judge Rosenbaum's concurring opinion demonstrates
that the majority in Parker v. Boyer rejected the Second Circuit's holding that the Fourth
Amendment is violated when the media accompany the police during the execution of a
search warrant at a private citizen's home. The disagreement between the Second and Eighth
Circuits is, therefore, not really on the issue of qualified immunity, but on whether the Fourth
Amendment is violated by the media's presence.
The Sixth Circuit has addressed the issue of the presence of a third party during the
execution of a search warrant. See Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d 596 (6th Cir. 1995); Bills v.
Aseltine, 958 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1992). The Sixth Circuit's position does not provide an
adequate resolution to the issue presented in this Note, but the Sixth Circuit's position is
worthy of discussion because the Sixth Circuit has failed to adopt a per se rule, like the
Second and Fourth Circuits, see Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 1995); Ayeni v.
Mottola, 35 F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994), holding that search warrants cannot be used to facilitate
private individual searches. "The Sixth Circuit has determined that the presence of a private
citizen at the execution of a search warrant is not a per se constitutional violation." Bills v.
Aseltine, 52 F.3d at 602 (private security guard conducted private independent search while
police executed a search warrant). In the Sixth Circuit, it is for the jury to decide whether the
police act unreasonably when they allow a third person to be present during the execution of a
search warrant. See Bills v. Aseltine, 52 F.3d at 603; Bills v. Aseltine, 958 F.2d at 705.
To be sure, independent third parties can assist the police in the execution of a search
warrant without the Fourth Amendment being violated, see, e.g., United States v. Clouston,
623 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (telephone workers present at search to identify
stolen telephone equipment); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994) (third parties can assist police
when assistance is needed), but the presence of the media, during the execution of a search
warrant for news or entertainment purposes, does not provide assistance. Therefore, upon a
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II. REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY
To conclude that the Fourth Amendment is violated when members of the
media accompany the police into a citizen's home during the execution of a
search warrant, one must first show that citizens have a reasonable expectation
of privacy in their homes.91 A reasonable expectation of privacy exists when a
person demonstrates a subjective expectation of privacy92 that society is willing
to recognize as reasonable. 93
A. Subjective Expectation of Privacy
The first requirement for Fourth Amendment protection is that a subjective
expectation of privacy be exhibited by the individual seeking Fourth
Amendment protection. 94 The home 95 is obviously a place where one
proper showing, the presence of the media can be viewed as a per se violation of the Fourth
Amendment and not as a question for the jury. In some rare situations the media may assist
the police during the execution of a search warrant, but in the normal case where the media is
simply covering the execution of a search warrant at an individual's home for news purposes,
no assistance is being offered. The Sixth Circuit's decision to place the issue of the
reasonableness of a third party's presence, during the execution of a search warrant, into the
hands of juries is erroneous because the presence of any third party who is not assisting the
police is unreasonable as a matter of law. The detached magistrate, upon issuing the warrant,
should determine whether or not the presence of the third party is necessary for the search to
be effective and reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. A determination of reasonableness
by a jury is not needed. That issue, however, is for another Note. This Note will focus on the
issue of whether or not the media's presence, for news or entertainment purposes, at the
execution of a search warrant is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment.
91 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); see
also supra Part II.B. 1.
92 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In determining
whether an subjective expectation of privacy exists, the inquiry is "whether the individual, by
his conduct, has 'exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy.'" Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J.,
concurring)). See also supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
93 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). In determining whether society is
willing to recognize a subjective expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable, the question
is whether "the individual's expectation, viewed objectively, is 'justifiable' under the
circumstances." Smith, 442 U.S. at 740 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 353). See also supra notes
37-39 and accompanying text.
94 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also supra Part II.B.1.
95 "It is also clear that one's reasonable expectation of privacy in the home is entitled to
a unique sensitivity from federal courts." United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.
1978).
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subjectively expects privacy.96 The home is where people eat, sleep, keep
personal belongings, and live their lives with their families.97 A person
subjectively expects privacy in the home because the home encompasses an
element of sanctity that is jealously guarded by the courts and the law.98 "The
home not only provides a domain in which to enjoy solitude and secrecy, it also
furnishes a readily identifiable space within which people can fearlessly enjoy
other entitlements of our free society." 99
Therefore, the first requirement of the Fourth Amendment-a subjective
expectation of privacy-is fulfilled. Individuals hold and demonstrate a
subjective expectation of privacy in their homes.1 00
B. Objectively Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Once a subjective expectation of privacy is established, that subjective
expectation of privacy must be an expectation of privacy that "society is
prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' ' ' 101 The home,102 by definition, is a
place where society is prepared to recognize subjective expectations of privacy
96 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) ("[A] man's home is, for most
purposes, a place where he expects privacy."). "Mhe sanctity of private dwellings [is]
ordinarily afforded the most stringent Fourth Amendment protection." United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
f C. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 n.54 (1980) (stating that the home is
where citizens can bid defiance).
98 'Me purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the home. See supra notes 18-19
and accompanying text. Reverence for the sacredness of the home has clearly been recognized
by the courts and commentators alike. See Ransom, supra note 3, at 333.
99 Tomkovicz, supra note 18, at 674. Furthermore, the home provides the arena for free
expression, religious practice, and personal autonomy. See id.
100 Some may question whether this reasonable expectation of privacy is forfeited or
destroyed when a search warrant is being executed. People who ask this question do not truly
understand what the reasonable expectation of privacy really is. This reasonable expectation is
only one of two thresholds that determine whether the Fourth Amendment is applicable to a
government act. See supra Part II.B.l. If there is this reasonable expectation in the home
(which there is), the Fourth Amendment allows for reasonable intrusions into the home.
Therefore, once this reasonable expectation is established and the government conducts a
search in the area where this reasonable expectation exists, the question is not whether the
reasonable expectation still exists, but whether the government's intrusion was reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. This reasonable expectation simply renders the Fourth
Amendment applicable.
101 Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also supra Part 1l.B.1.
102 "It is certainly true that a homeowner has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
contents of his home." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 732 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis added).
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as objectively reasonable. 10 3 To conclude that society does not view subjective
expectations of privacy in the home as reasonable, one would have to make the
absurd conclusion that society is unwilling to accept a place mentioned in the
Constitution-the home-as a place where an individual can reasonably expect
privacy. 104 Therefore, because individuals have subjective expectations of
privacy in their own homes and because society views these privacy
expectations as reasonable, the first Fourth Amendment threshold is fulfilled
when members of the media accompany the police into an individual's home
during the execution of a search warrant.
IV. STATE ACTION AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN PRIVATE AND
GOVERNMENT SEARCHES
Even after a reasonable expectation of privacy is established, to conclude
that the Fourth Amendment's standards of reasonableness are applicable to
media activity, one must demonstrate that the media's presence was
governmental. 105  Therefore, a critical issue surrounding the Fourth
103 See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 2:7, at 62.
104 When the cases that discuss the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and the sanctity
of the home are examined, it is easy to see that the Court has, in effect, recognized that
subjective expectations in the home are, as a matter of law, objectively reasonable. See, e.g.,
Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-85 (1980) (recognizing that the Fourth Amendment
applies to all government intrusions into the home). Cases that directly address reasonable
expectations of privacy in the home are difficult to uncover because of the fact that it is
assumed that because the Fourth Amendment was enacted, in part, to protect the home, it is
reasonable to expect privacy in the home. See Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth Amendment Standing, 27 U. Mat. L.
REv. 907, 958 (1997). "In the context of houses, whether a person who lives in the house has
a reasonable expectation of privacy is rarely at issue. [Thus, a] homeowner has virtually
unlimited expectations of privacy from intrusions into his home." Id.
Some may question whether society will accept, as reasonable, an expectation of privacy
subjectively held during the execution of a search warrant by an individual. This question can
easily be answered in the affirmative. The courts have repeatedly shown that warrants must
be executed reasonably in scope and manner. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
This is de facto recognition that when a warrant is being executed there is still an expectation
of privacy present that society will view as reasonable. Again, cases that discuss expectations
of privacy when the home is involved are difficult to locate because it is assumed a reasonable
expectation of privacy exists in the home.
105 See supra Part II.B.2. The Fourth Amendment will always apply to the police when
they are executing a search warrant, but the media will only be liable if they are state actors.
Therefore, the issue of whether the media members are state actors is crucial to determining
Fourth Amendment liability. Moreover, if the media's presence is wholly independent of the
police's execution of the search warrant, then the media's presence would not affect the police
1997]
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Amendment's applicability to the media's presence during the execution of a
search warrant at an individual's home is the distinction between searches
conducted by private actors and searches conducted by government actors.10 6
That is, when members of the media accompany the police into an individual's
home during the execution of a search warrant, are the media members
government actors participating in the execution of the search warrant or are
they private actors conducting an independent private search of the individual's
home?107
officer's reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment. See supra notes 43-49 and
accompanying text. For further discussion and analysis of the distinction between private and
government searches, see generally Emily M. Stout, Comment, Bounty Hunters as Evidence
Gatherers: Should They Be Considered State Actors Under the Fourth Amendment when
Working with Police?, 65 U. CN. L. REv. 665, 670-73 (1997); Timothy B. Lemon,
Comment, The Fourth Amendment's Prohibitions on Encryption Limitation: Will 1995 Be
Like 1984?, 58 ALB. L. REv. 467, 479-80 (1994).
106 Private searches, unlike government searches, do not implicate the Fourth
Amendment. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921); see also 1 HAuL, supra
note 28, § 12:1, at 549; Black, supra note 41, at 33.
107 Analysis and resolution of this issue is determinative of whether the media can be
held liable for possible violations of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, this issue also
affects the analysis of police conduct and liability. For now, it is sufficient to provide how the
Second and Eighth Circuits addressed this issue, since the issue will be fully addressed infra.
The Second Circuit did not address the issue of whether the CBS television crew was a
state actor when it accompanied the police into the Ayenis' home. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35
F.3d 680 (2d Cir. 1994). The reason the court did not address the issue is most likely because
CBS settled the case before the case was heard on appeal. See id. at 684 n.2. However, the
Second Circuit concluded that the police violated the Fourth Amendment without discussing
the distinction between private and public searches. See id. at 686. That is, was the Fourth
Amendment violated in Ayeni because the police facilitated and participated in an
unreasonable private search or because the CBS television crew was an unauthorized state
actor? The Fourth Amendment can be implicated on either theory. However, the proper
theory on which to base a Fourth Amendment violation in these cases is the media members
are unauthorized state actors (unless a detached magistrate authorizes their presence when
issuing the warrant) who participate in the execution of the search warrant. Declaring the
media members unauthorized state actors does not mean their action is private. It simply
means that their joint activity with the police is not permitted (authorized) by the warrant and,
therefore, is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. By declaring the media unauthorized
state actors, it is possible to clearly establish the media's liability for damages for violating the
Fourth Amendment.
The Eighth Circuit addressed the issue of state action in the Parker case. See Parker v.
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997). The Eighth
Circuit, in holding that KSDK did not act under color of state law, concluded that KSDK
acted independently of the police when it entered the home and videotaped the search. See id.
at 448. KSDK, according to the court, did not exercise a right or privilege created by the state
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A. The Media as State Actors Jointly Participating in the Execution of a
Search Warrant
The Supreme Court has clearly established that private persons act under
color of law when they are willful participants in joint activity with the State or
its agents. 10 8 Media members, who cover the execution of a search warrant by
entering an individual's home with the police, are private persons acting under
color of state law because they are willful and joint participants in government
action-the execution of a search warrant.109
The media willfflly participate in the execution of search warrants in an
effort to obtain video footage that will capture more viewers and bolster
ratings." 0 The media members often ride with the police to the home that is
going to be searched and gain access to the home only after the police enter the
citizen's home."' If the police were not executing the search warrant, the
media would only be able to gain access to the interior of the home through the
owner's consent1n 2 The show of authority by the police under color of law is
what allows the media to enter the private home. It is only through this willful
and voluntary joint activity that the media know where the warrant is going to
be executed, cover the execution of the search warrant, enter the private home
when it entered the home to videotape the search. See id. Chief Judge Richard S. Arnold
concurred with the Eighth Circuit's holding that the Fourth Amendment had not been violated
at the Parkers' home, but the Chief Judge did dissent on the issue of state action. See id. at
448-49 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also supra note 81 and
accompanying text (discussing Chief Judge Arnold's opinion).
10 8 See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970) (explaining that a
private party involved in a conspiracy with a state actor can be liable under § 1983 for a civil
rights violation); see also Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 941 (1982) (stating that
joint action between private and state actors can place private actors' conduct under color of
law); United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (noting that private persons jointly
engaged with state officials are acting under color of law).
109 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 449 (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
110 See Walsh, supra note 1, at 1144.
111 See id. at 1127-28; see also Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 446-47; Ayeni v. Mottola,
35 F.3d at 683.
112 It seems clear that if the media simply went to a home and entered the home without
the permission of the individuals present, the media would be liable for an action in trespass.
If the media's presence without the resident's consent violates tort law, then it follows that the
media's presence without the owner's consent cannot be rendered lawful simply because the
police are executing a search warrant. If the Court still utilized trespass theory to examine
Fourth Amendment issues, it might easily be concluded that the media's presence violates the
Fourth Amendment, but the Court has moved away from trespass theory to the reasonable
expectation of privacy standard. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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of the private citizen whose home is being searched, and videotape the
execution of the subsequent search. It is the government's execution of a search
warrant that serves as the necessary prerequisite to the media's coverage.
Without the government action, the media coverage would simply not occur.
Therefore, media members do act under color of law when they
accompany the police into a private individual's home during the execution of a
search warrant. The media and the police are liable then if the media's presence
during the search is unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment. 113
B. The Media as Private Actors Conducting a Private Independent
Search
Even if media members are considered independent actors conducting an
independent private search and not considered state actors willfully participating
in the execution of a search warrant when they enter an individual's home with
police during the execution of a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment can
still be violated. 114 Police involvement in private searches, under certain
circumstances, can transform a private search into a public search that is subject
to Fourth Amendment limitations.115 Under this theory, however, only the
police, and not the members of the media, would be liable for the constitutional
violation.116
When police participate in a private search, ask a private person to conduct
a search, or observe the private party's execution of a search, the search is no
longer private and the Fourth Amendment is implicated.'1 7 The issue of
113 See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144. The issue of whether the media's presence is
unreasonable will be discussed infra Part V.114 Private searches cannot by themselves implicate the Fourth Amendment. See supra
note 41 and accompanying text. However, police involvement in a private search can
implicate the Fourth Amendment. See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 12:4, at 557. Furthermore,
the Fourth Amendment can be violated by the presence of a third party during the execution
of a search warrant. See, e.g., Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995); Ayeni
v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686; Hagler v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-2154,
1996 WL 408605, at *3 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1996). The Fourth Amendment is also obviously
implicated in these cases because search warrants must be executed in a reasonable manner.
Fourth Amendment analysis and standards cannot be escaped by simply concluding that the
media's presence was not under the color of state law.
115 See supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text; see also 1 HALL, supra note 28,
§ 12:1, at 550. Private searches are considered public searches, under certain circumstances,
to prevent government actors from evading Fourth Amendment standards by simply
employing private citizens to conduct searches. See id. at §§ 12:1-12:4.
116 See, e.g., Adickes, 398 U.S. at 144.
117 See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 12:4, at 557. Note, however, if "the police do not
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whether a private search implicates the Fourth Amendment because of a police
presence hinges on the "consideration of the actual participation by the
government agent in the total enterprise of securing evidence by other than
appropriate means."' 18
Even if the media is not present under color of law, the media's presence
during the execution of a search warrant cannot be considered a private search
that is exempt from Fourth Amendment limitations and standards. 119 First, the
police are present during the media's search of the home. 120 Second, the police
actively participate in the media's search in the sense that the police grant the
media access to the citizen's home. Finally, the police provide protection to the
media as a videotape of the inside of the home is made. This police involvement
is sufficient enough to subject the media's actions-even if considered a private
search-to Fourth Amendment standards and limitations. 121 Therefore, it does
tacitly encourage the search, they take a tip derived from a private search to conduct an
otherwise valid search, or they do not get involved until after the search occurs, it is a private
search." Id. (footnotes omitted). The Fourth Amendment has also been implicated when the
police make a private person their agent for the purpose of a criminal investigation. See id. at
556.
118 Id. "[A] search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it." Lustig v.
United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78 (1949) (noting that a federal officer must be deemed to have
participated in a search so long as he was involved before the object of the search was
completely accomplished).
119 Compare United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149, 1153 (7th Cir. 1975) (holding
that federal agent's presence while airline employee searched luggage rendered search public
and Fourth Amendment applicable), and Stapleton v. Superior Ct., 447 P.2d 967, 970 (Cal.
1968) (concluding that police officers' presence and failure to protect citizen from illegal
private search rendered private search public); with Pleasant v. Lovell, 654 F. Supp. 1082,
1089 (D. Colo. 1987) (concluding that a federal agent's acceptance of information from a
private informant did not render the private informant's search public), rev'd in part, 876
F.2d 787 (10th Cir. 1989), and Gundlach v. Janing, 401 F. Supp. 1089, 1093 (D. Neb. 1975)
(holding that police's knowledge that a private person might conduct an illegal search did not
transform the private search into a public search), af'd, 536 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1976). See
BLooM & BRODiN, supra note 27, at 20 & n.3 (citing these cases to show support for
applying the Fourth Amendment to illegal searches by private citizens who previously
summoned police to the scene).
120 For a discussion on whether the media's presence is a search or a seizure under the
Fourth Amendment, see Antonio Yanez, Jr., Note, Ayeni v. Mottola and the Implications of
Characterizing Videotaping as a Fourth Amendment Seizure, 61 BROOK. L. REv. 507, 530-
31 (1995) (arguing that videotaping should be properly characterized as a search and not a
seizure).
121 The Eighth Circuit stated that KSDK's actions were at most parallel to and
contemporaneous with the police officers' execution of a search warrant. See Parker v.
Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 448 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1081 (1997). This
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not matter (in terms of whether or not the Fourth Amendment is implicated and
violated) whether the police jointly execute the search with members of the
media at the individual's home or whether the police simply allow the media to
enter the individual's home and conduct a private search during the execution
of a search warrant. The Fourth Amendment applies and its standards and
limitations will be used to determine the reasonableness of the media's
presence.
V. THE MEDIA'S PRESENCE DURING THE EXECUTION OF A SEARCH
WARRANT IS UNREASONABLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
This Note has clearly established that the threshold requirements of the
Fourth Amendment are fulfilled and that the Fourth Amendment is applicable
when the media is present during the execution of a search warrant. 122
Therefore, the final step in Fourth Amendment analysis must take place: Does a
search transcend the bounds of reasonableness when the media accompany the
police into a private individual's home during the execution of a search
warrant? The media's entrance into a private individual's home during the
execution of a search warrant is unreasonable because: (1) the media's presence
exceeds the actions authorized by the warrant; (2) the media's presence creates
an additional invasion of the home that is unnecessary; and (3) the media's
presence causes an additional harm. 123
A. The Media's Presence Exceeds the Actions Authorized by a Search
Warrant
Police officers who execute a search warrant are limited in their conduct to
actions expressly authorized by the search warrant124 or to actions that are
statement was made in analyzing whether or not KSDK was a state actor in the execution of
the search warrant. See id. Because the Eighth Circuit went on to examine whether the police
violated the Fourth Amendment by allowing the media crew to enter the Parkers' home, the
Eighth Circuit demonstrated that you cannot evade Fourth Amendment analysis simply by
concluding that the media did not act under color of law. See id. The Fourth Amendment is
implicated because a search warrant is being executed and because the media's presence is not
an independent private search immune from the Fourth Amendment's standards. See Newton,
510 F.2d at 1153; Stapleton, 447 P.2d at 970.122 See supra Parts Iu.-IV.
123 This is not an exhaustive list of reasons why the media's presence is unreasonable,
but these reasons demonstrate why a per se rule declaring media presence unreasonable is
needed.
124 See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 394 n.7 (1971) (stating that bounds are set by the search warrant) (citing Marron v.
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impliedly authorized by the search warrant because such actions are reasonably
related to accomplishing the authorized search or accomplishing additional
legitimate law enforcement objectives.12 5
The media's presence is outside of a warrant's scope. 126 The media is not
expressly authorized by search warrants to participate in the searches of
people's homes, 127 and the media's presence cannot be impliedly authorized by
the warrant because the media's presence during the execution of a search
United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927)); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 685 (2d Cir.
1994). Furthermore, the authority to search is limited to the purpose of the wan-ant. See 2
LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 4.10(d), at 678 (noting that evidence found by actions exceeding
the scope of the warrant must be suppressed). Actions conducted by the police that do not
serve the purpose of the warrant are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment because they
exceed the scope of the warrant. See id.
12 5 See Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (holding that a search warrant
to search for contraband implicitly provides limited authority for detaining the occupants
during the search); Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 685.
126 In reality, the media's presence is nothing more than state-supported trespass. The
media cannot enter an individual's home without consent. The media, however, does just
that-enter a private home without consent-when it accompanies the police during the
execution of a search warrant at a private residence. The question then arises: If the media are
illegally trespassing on the resident's property or invading the resident's privacy, why are
constitutional remedies necessary when general tort remedies are already available? First,
"the tort of invasion of privacy may properly have little if any actual bite." C. Edwin Baker,
Giving the Audience What It Wants, 58 Oo ST. L.J. 311, 380 (1997); see also Diane L.
Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis's Privacy
Tort, 68 CoRNEL L. REv. 291, 362 (1983) (explaining that privacy torts have little power).
Second, and more fundamentally, the remedy should be available for what actually occurs-a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. When the media accompany the police during the
execution of a search warrant, it is not a simple trespass or a simple invasion of privacyissue;
rather, it is a state-supported trespass or invasion of privacy which is an abuse of government
power. The Fourth Amendment was designed to prohibit abuse of government power, see
supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text, so the remedy should lie within the Fourth
Amendment itself. Furthermore, a remedy sought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) for a
violation of the Fourth Amendment will be more complete since a prevailing plaintiff in a
§ 1983 lawsuit can recover attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994). See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1994).
127 There is of course the possibility that the media could be named as an authorized
actor in the wan-ant. For example, if a local television station was burglarized, officials from
the station could accompany the police during the execution of the search warrant in order to
identify the station's stolen property. See United States v. Clouston, 623 F.2d 485, 485 (6th
Cir. 1980) (per curiam) (holding that telephone workers' presence during the search was
reasonable because workers were present to identify stolen telephone equipment). This,
however, would not authorize the television station to cover the execution of the search
warrant in a media capacity.
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warrant does not serve a legitimate law enforcement objective.' 28
Therefore, if media members are viewed as state actors when they
accompany the police during the execution of a search warrant, then the media
members are unauthorized state actors who violate the Fourth Amendment
when they enter an individual's home. If media members are viewed as private
actors when they accompany the police during the execution of a search
warrant, then the media members do not themselves violate the Fourth
Amendment. However, their presence violates the Fourth Amendment because
it serves no legitimate government objective and is not authorized by the search
warrant itself.129
128 Me Second Circuit demonstrated that general Fourth Amendment principles
establish the unreasonableness of the media's presence during the execution of a search
warrant. See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686. However, the Second Circuit also noted that
there is statutory reinforcement for the conclusion that the media's presence violates the
Fourth Amendment. See id. at 687. Federal law provides:
A search warrant may in all cases be served by any of the officers mentioned in its
direction or by an officer authorized by law to serve such warrant, but by no other
person, except in aid of the officer on his requiring it, he being present and acting in its
execution.
18 U.S.C. § 3105 (1994). "This statute identifies those who may 'serve' a search warrant-
only authorized officers and those legitimately assisting officers, but it has been construed to
determine those who may 'execute' a warrant." Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 687. The statute
does not determine the entire scope of the Fourth Amendment, but it does provide a
background for the reasonableness standard. For cases demonstrating that the presence of a
third party does not violate the Fourth Amendment or 18 U.S.C. § 3105, see Clouston, 623
F.2d at 486-87 (telephone company employee present to identify stolen telephone equipment);
United States v. Gambino, 734 F. Supp. 1084, 1091 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (informant assisting in
the installation of listening devices on the defendant's property).
129 See Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d 347, 356 (4th Cir. 1995).
[We have no doubt that the Fourth Amendment prohibits government agents from
allowing a search warrant to be used to facilitate a private individual's independent
search of another's home for items unrelated to those specified in the warrant. Such a
search is not "reasonable." It obviously exceeds the scope of the required specific
warrant and furthermore violates the "sanctity of private dwellings."
Id. (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976)) (emphasis added).
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B. The Media's Presence Creates an Additional and Unnecessary
Invasion of the Home
When a search warrant is executed at the home of a private individual, the
home of that private individual is invaded. The Fourth Amendment, however,
tries to minimize the intrusion by requiring that the search be reasonably
conducted in both intensity and duration. 130 The presence of the media during
the execution of a search warrant in a private citizen's home unnecessarily
causes a more intense invasion of the home, unreasonably violating the sanctity
of that home. 131
The Second Circuit, in discussing the media's presence at the Ayenis'
home, stated:
The unreasonableness of Mottola's conduct in Fourth Amendment terms is
heightened by the fact that, not only was it wholly lacking in justification based
on the legitimate needs of law enforcement, but it was calculated to inflict
injury on the very value that the Fourth Amendment seeks to protect-the right
of privacy. The purpose of bringing the CBS camera crew into the Ayenis'
home was to permit public broadcast of their private premises and thus to
magnify needlessly the impairment of their right of privacy. 132
The Eighth Circuit, on the issue of the sanctity of the home and the right of
privacy, missed the mark. The Eighth Circuit failed to address how the media's
presence did not violate the right of privacy or the sanctity of the home when
130 See 2 LAFAVE, supra note 21, § 4.10(d), at 670. "The permissible intensity of the
search within the described premises is determined by the description of the things to be
seized." Id. Therefore, when the warrant is issued to search for something small, the police
can search more closely and thoroughly than when the warrant is issued to search for
something large. For example, the police can search a desk when looking for stolen checks,
but cannot search that same desk when looking for a stolen television set. See id. Therefore,
"given the longstanding requirements that the officers remain on the premises only so long as
is reasonably necessary to conduct the search and that they avoid unnecessary damage to the
premises, it would appear that the police are not completely free to pursue the search in any
manner they choose." Id. § 4.10(d), at 673-74 (footnotes omitted).
131 "[Ihe sanctity of the home... has been embedded in our traditions since the
origins of the Republic." Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980). "No study of the
scope of fourth amendment coverage would be complete without acknowledging that the
principle of home sanctity resides securely at the core of the guarantee and motivates its
restraints upon official search and seizure power." Tomkovicz, supra note 18, at 674 n.120.
The sanctity of the home has been well recognized by the judiciary. See Ransom, supra note
3, at 333.132 Ayenl v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686.
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granting Boyer qualified imunity.133 The Eighth Circuit simply, in an
inexcusable fashion, stated: "Nor do we think it self-evident that the police
offend general fourth-amendment principles when they allow members of the
news media to enter someone's house during the execution of a search
warrant."1 34 If the sanctity of the home truly exists (which it does), 135 then,
contrary to the Eighth Circuit's opinion, the home cannot become "a
soundstage for law enforcement theatricals"136 simply because a search warrant
has been issued. 137 "A search warrant is simply not a press pass."'1 38
Therefore, in light of the reverence that is afforded to the home under the
Fourth Amendment, the media's presence during the execution of a search
warrant is unreasonable.
C. The Media's Presence Causes an Additional Harm
The greatest reason for concluding that the media's presence during the
execution of a search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment is that the
media's presence creates an additional harm.139 The additional harm is not the
additional invasion of the physical privacy of the home suffered by the
individual, but is the actual invasion of personal privacy suffered by the
individual residents because of the media's coverage and broadcast of the
133 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
1081 (1997).134 Id. at 446. This statement forced Judge Rosenbaum to concur specially, as he
"would find, consistent with Ayeni v. Mottola, that police officials executing a search warrant
violate a resident's Fourth Amendment rights, when they admit representatives of the public
media into a private citizen's home without first securing the resident's express consent." Id.
at 448 (Rosenbaum, J., concurring specially) (citation omitted).
135 "The sanctity of the home is not to be disputed." Segura v. United States, 468 U.S.
796, 810 (1984).
136 Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d at 686.
137 "The confidentiality assured by our homes is valuable not just because it closes
actual doors to the government, but because it opens figurative doors for those who dwell
within." Tomkovicz, supra note 18, at 675. These "figurative doors" will no longer remain
open if search warrants grant the media access to private dwellings.
138 Hagler v. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc., No. CIV.A.96-2154, 1996 WL 408605, at
*2 (E.D. Pa. July 12, 1996).
139 This argument may at first glance seem to be the same as a further invasion of
privacy, discussed supra Part V.B., but this point is totally independent from the invasion of
the physical privacy of the home. Invasion of privacy involves the destruction of a private
area where privacy is expected. The additional harm is the consequence that results from
media coverage. The invasion of the expected personal privacy area is separate and apart
from the sanctity of the home where physical privacy is reasonably expected.
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search.140 There is nothing equivalent to the exclusionary rule for private actors
like the media.1 41 A hypothetical will best illustrate this additional harm.
142
Take the typical facts of the Ayeni or Parker cases. 143 The police arrive at
an individual's home to execute a search warrant. The television camera crew
from a local station is accompanying the police. The television camera crew
enters the home behind the police, as the police properly enter the home
pursuant to the warrant. The resident objects to the media's presence, but the
police allow the media to remain in the home. The camera crew videotapes the
search, the inside of the home, and the residents. The police find some
contraband, arrest one of the residents, and leave the home, taking the
140 Actua1 broadcast of the search is not a necessary component of this additional harm.
To be sure, broadcast of the video obtained during the search magnifies the additional harm,
but additional harm also occurs simply from the anxiety of possible media broadcast.
Moreover, the Fourth Amendment "prohibits 'unreasonable searches and seizures' whether or
not the evidence is sought to be used in a criminal trial, and is fidiy accomplished' at the time
of an unreasonable governmental intrusion." United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S.
259, 264 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting in part United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906
(1984); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 354 (1974)).
141 See 1 HALL, supra note 28, § 12:1, at 550. One reason why the Fourth Amendment
is inapplicable to private actors is because the judicially created exclusionary rule is designed
to deter improper police conduct and is not designed for, nor applicable against, private
action. See id. The Fourth Amendment protects against government intrusion, not private
intrusion. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
142 The media's coverage of the Olympic Park bombing in Atlanta and Richard Jewell is
illustrative of the additional harm being argued here. Richard Jewell was, at first, the hero of
the Olympic Park bombing. See Richard Corliss, From Fame to Infamy, TIME, Aug. 12,
1996, at 24. Jewell was interviewed on network television as the security guard who saved
lives. See id. Jewell, however, after being considered a hero, was named as a suspect. See id.
The media hounded Jewell, replayed earlier interviews of Jewell, the hero, and questioned
why he was ever hired as a security guard. See id. Jewell proclaimed his innocence
throughout the ordeal until he was finally removed from the list of suspects. See id.; see also
David Van Biema, Atlanta's Fed-Up Suspect, TIME, Sept. 2, 1996, at 44. Jewell, according
to one of his attorneys, now has no "'semblance of normal life'" despite the fact that he was
cleared as a suspect. Van Biema, supra (quoting G. Watson Bryant, Jr., Jewell's attorney).
Furthermore, Jewell's family has been left distraught over the entire ordeal. See id. The
legality, morality, or professionalism of the media's conduct concerning Jewell and the
bombing are not at issue here. Jewell simply demonstrates that media coverage can be
exceptionally harmful to a person's expected personal privacy even if a person is cleared of all
criminal charges or is never even formally charged with a crime. Therefore, when the
execution of a search warrant is broadcast, an additional harm (invasion of personal privacy)
occurs that is not remedied by the dismissal of criminal charges, suppression of evidence, or
acquittal at trial. The invasion of personal privacy lingers because of the publicity the search
captured.
143 See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text; notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
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television camera crew with them. The additional harm comes next.
The media members who accompanied the police now have video footage
of the execution of the search warrant. The video will be broadcasted numerous
times. In fact, the media will probably headline the coverage in its news
promotions. The residents of the home are offended, embarrassed, and labeled
by the community. This is all in addition to the increased invasion of physical
privacy the residents incurred when the media entered their home. The
residents suffer from the invasion of their expected personal privacy because
their personal lives are made public by the media's entrance into their home
pursuant to a valid search warrant. 144
Furthermore, the residents will have no immediate recourse to prevent the
media from broadcasting the videotape. 145 The residents will be able to
challenge what the police obtained during the search by filing a motion to
suppress, but there is no such equivalent to prevent the media's use of the video
for the media's benefit. This demonstrates the additional harm residents
experience when the media enters their home during the execution of a search
warrant. The additional harm to expected personal privacy will exist even if
criminal charges are never filed or are subsequently dismissed, or the residents
are eventually acquitted or convicted at trial.
The residents may subsequently file a lawsuit against the media and the
police to recover damages, but some courts, based on the Eighth Circuit's
reading of the Fourth Amendment, will reject the residents' complaint that the
media violated the Fourth Amendment and will grant the police officers
qualified immunity.146 If a per se rule similar to that of the Second Circuit is
adopted, this additional harm will not occur because the media will not
accompany the police during the execution of search warrants at private
homes. 147
144 Cy. Oziel v. Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 196, 206 (Ct. App. 1990) (refusing to
release police-made videotapes of a search because, among other things, residents had a
constitutionally protected right to privacy).
145 An injunction might be possible, but if the court finds that no rights have been
violated by the media's coverage of the search, what legal theory would support the
injunction? Furthermore, in reality it is likely that there would not be enough time to get an
injunction even if one was available on some legal theory. For example, if a search warrant is
executed at 10:30 p.m. and the news broadcast is at 11:00 p.m., when would the injunction
be obtained? The video of the search would be broadcasted before the residents recovered
from the initial shock of the intrusive search. In addition, the residents may, in fact, be in jail
during the time between the search and broadcast, leaving them with no opportunity to take
the necessary steps to challenge the broadcast of the search.
146 See, e.g., Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d 445, 447 (8th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 1081 (1997).
147 If the media accompanies the police during the execution of a search warrant
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Therefore, because the additional harm that occurs when the media
accompany the police during the execution of a search warrant is severe,
unavoidable by the residents, and preventable by the police, the media's
presence during the execution of a search warrant violates the Fourth
Amendment's reasonableness standard.
VI. CONCLUSION
Invasions of private homes by the media during the execution of search
warrants cannot be taken lightly nor summarily analyzed through the use of
conclusory language. 148 Methodical Fourth Amendment analysis must be
applied to successfully address and resolve the issue. Such analysis
demonstrates that the media's presence during the execution of a search warrant
at an individual's home is a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment. The
Fourth Amendment is applicable to the issue because individuals hold a
reasonable expectation of privacy in their homes and because the media's
presence during the execution of a search warrant cannot be considered an
independent private search immune from the standards and limitations of the
Fourth Amendment. Finally, the media's presence during the execution of a
search warrant is unreasonable because the presence exceeds the conduct
permitted by the search warrant, unnecessarily and unreasonably causes an
additional invasion of privacy, and creates an additional harm that cannot be
immediately remedied, if at all, by those who are subjected to the media's
presence. The sanctity of the home will no longer exist if, as the Eighth Circuit
has held, the media can accompany the police into a private citizen's home
during the routine execution of search warrants. 149 Courts should follow the
lead of the Second Circuit and refuse to let search warrants be used by the
subsequent to the adoption of a per se rule against such accompaniment, damages will be used
to compensate the victim for the additional harm suffered. Damages, however, are second
best to prevention. Since a per se rule would prevent the additional harm, a per se rule should
be used to deter media presence, rather than possible jury determinations of damages on a
case-by-case basis.
148 Supreme Court decisions "reflect no lack of solicitude for the right of an individual
'to be let alone' in the privacy of the home, 'sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the weary,
and the sick.'" Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980) (quoting Gregory v. Chicago, 394
U.S. 111, 125 (1969) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
149 See Parker v. Boyer, 93 F.3d at 447 (concluding that the Fourth Amendment's
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures is not violated when police allow the media
to be present during the execution of a search warrant).
15331997]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
media as general admission tickets to the homes and lives of private citizens. 150
150 See Ayeni v. Mottola, 35 F.3d 680, 686 (2d Cir. 1994) (Fourth Amendment
prohibits the police from allowing media presence during the execution of a search warrant).
As this Note was on its way to print, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
indeed followed the Second Circuit's lead and held that the media's presence during the
execution of a valid search warrant violates the Fourth Amendment. See James Sterngold,
Court Rules Against CNN in Search Case, N.Y. TMa, Nov. 14, 1997, at C5. The Ninth
Circuit concluded that the agreement between the United States Attorney's office and CNN to
allow CNN to film the search "'transformed the execution of a search warrant into television
entertainment.'" Id. (quoting the yet published Ninth Circuit decision in Berger v. Hanann,
No. 96-35266 (9th Cir. Nov. 13, 1997)).
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